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In the Origin of Species, Darwin wrote:  
 
I have hitherto spoken as if the variations—so common and multiform in organic be-
ings under domestication, and in a lesser degree in those in a state of nature—had been 
due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression, but it serves to ac-
knowledge plainly our ignorance of the causes of each particular variation (Darwin 
1859, 131). 
 
In these lines, Darwin can be interpreted as expressing a subjective view of chance—most 
likely a consequence of a metaphysical doctrine which was held by many 19th century scien-
tists. This doctrine, of course, is determinism and was most succinctly formulated by Pierre 
Laplace. According to this doctrine, our failure to predict or explain a natural event cannot be 
attributed to probabilistic causes or objective chance. Instead, the reasons for such failures 
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must be sought in our ignorance of the real causes determining the event. In other words, for 
the determinist, chance is merely an appearance or an illusion which arises because of the 
finite nature of human reason.  
Was Darwin right about this? Or should we revise our thinking about chance in evolution in 
light of the more advanced, quantitative models of Neo-Darwinian theory, which make sub-
stantial use of statistical reasoning and the concept of probability? Is determinism still a viable 
metaphysical doctrine about biological reality after the quantum revolution in physics, or do 
we have to abandon it in favor of an objective indeterminism? In light of such reflections, 
what is the relevant interpretation of probability in evolutionary theory? Do biologists use the 
concept of probability because they are finite cognitive agents or because the evolutionary 
process is fundamentally probabilistic? In this paper, I will show that we do not yet fully un-
derstand the nature of chance in evolution.  
In the next section, I will review the different evolutionary contexts in which chance and 
probability appear. In Section 3, I take a brief look at chance and probability in physics, since 
I believe that there are lessons to be learnt from the philosophy of physics. In Sections 4 und 5 
I critically discuss an instrumentalist and a scientific realist account of the statistical nature of 
evolutionary theory. I show that they are both unsatisfactory. In Section 6, I show that there 
are viable alternatives to these accounts. I sketch one such alternative, which is compatible 
with both determinism and realism and which tries to do justice to the scientists’ own thinking 
on this problem. In Section 7, I turn to the question of whether evolutionary processes are 
deterministic or not. An examination of the arguments presented by indeterminists will lead 
me to agnosticism about this question. Finally, in Section 8, I show that there are limits to our 
understanding of the metaphysical foundations of Darwinism. 
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2. Chance and Probability in Evolution 
 
In the passage from the Origin which I have quoted above, Darwin was concerned with the 
causes of genetic variation. Modern geneticists, of course, know much more about the causes 
of genetic variation than Darwin did. Molecular geneticists have discovered a variety of 
mechanisms which can cause changes in an organism’s genetic material, also known as muta-
tions. It is a central tenet of Neo-Darwinism that mutations are random in the sense that their 
probability of occurring is causally independent of their effect on an organism’s fitness. In 
other words, mutations which are beneficial or detrimental for an organism’s survival and 
reproduction are not made more likely by virtue of their being beneficial or detrimental. The 
mechanisms which cause mutations are “blind” to adaptive value. I believe that this is the 
correct sense in which mutations can be said to be random. However, this account of chance 
variation leaves an important question unanswered: What exactly do we mean by “probabil-
ity” or “likelihood” when we say that mutations are not made more probable or more likely by 
virtue of their adaptive value? Does this probability express an irreducibly stochastic disposi-
tion of the kind postulated in quantum mechanics? Since the Neo-Darwinian definition of 
random mutation is also compatible with strict determinism, questions like these are far from 
being trivial.  
I am going to argue that we cannot give a definitive answer to this question, in spite of the 
fact that molecular geneticists know so much about the mechanisms causing mutations. The 
reason is that we do not know, at present, whether evolutionary processes are deterministic or 
not. Thus, we do not know exactly what the nature of chance is in the mechanisms generating 
genetic variation. For the most part of the present paper, I want to leave the issue of random 
mutation aside. For the concepts of chance and probability arise in different contexts in Neo-
Darwinian theory, and it is these other contexts with which I will be mainly concerned here.  
The main issues I will be addressing are the following: First, what is the relevant sense of 
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chance and probability in different evolutionary models? Second, why do evolutionary biolo-
gists use probabilistic concepts? Is it due to the nature of the evolutionary process or the finite 
nature of human reason? 
Probabilistic concepts occur in different contexts in contemporary models of evolutionary 
change.1 First, they appear in the theory of natural selection. Unless a population of organ-
isms is infinitely large—which is physically impossible—the outcome of natural selection is 
not fully determined by the fitness values of all the individuals in the population. In finite 
populations, there is always a non-zero probability that the fittest do not survive (Beatty 
1984). Furthermore, if we focus our attention on individual organisms, we find that the indi-
vidual’s actual reproductive success is not fully determined by its fitness value. This fitness 
value provides only a statistical expectation, for example, a probability distribution that the 
organism has 0, 1, 2, 3, or n surviving offspring (Beatty and Finsen 1989, Mills and Beatty 
1979). Second, probabilities occur in the theory of random genetic drift. Genetic drift is de-
fined as an evolutionary process in which the change of gene frequencies is independent of 
any gene’s contribution to fitness. Drift has also been described as a random sampling proc-
ess, while “random” means that population sampling is indiscriminate with respect to pheno-
typic properties (Beatty 1984, 1987). Third, probabilities are used in certain models of mac-
roevolutionary change. Macroevolution can be modeled as a stochastic branching process in 
order to explain certain long-term phylogenetic patterns (Sober 1988). Fourth and finally, 
probabilities arise in evolutionary models which consider the effect of new mutations on a 
population. 
As this brief overview demonstrates, modern evolutionary theory is profoundly statistical in 
nature. Statistical concepts are used by evolutionary biologists not just for data analysis, but 
as an integral part of most of the theoretical models they advance in order to explain evolu-
tionary change. Like in other scientific disciplines which deal with statistical theories, the use 
of probabilistic concepts raise a number of difficult foundational, epistemological and meta-
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physical issues. Let me first relate a general observation, which should be uncontroversial. 
The reasons why scientists resort to statistical theories may differ considerably, depending on 
the theories’ subject domain. This is evident if we take a brief look at modern physics.  
 
 
3. A Brief Look at Chance and Probability in Physics 
 
Probably the most important physical theories which use statistical reasoning are the theo-
ries of statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics. During the 1960s, it became clear that 
these theories differ fundamentally with respect to the foundational issues surrounding chance 
and probability.2 Classical statistical mechanics assumes that the systems it models are gov-
erned by fully deterministic laws of motion, namely Newton’s laws. The reason why the theo-
ries of statistical mechanics are statistical is that their subject domain consists of systems 
which are composed of an extremely large number of particles, for example, a macroscopic 
container filled with gas molecules that interact with each other as well as with the walls of 
the container. It would be impossible to solve the equations of motion for each of these parti-
cles in order to explain the bulk properties of this physical system. For this reason, physicists 
abstract from the trajectories of each individual gas molecule and investigate probability dis-
tributions, e.g., the probability that a system composed of N particles is found in a certain 
region of an abstract state space of 6N dimensions. According to the standard interpretation, 
such probability assignments generalize over hypothetical, infinitely large sets of systems—
so-called ensembles—which differ only in initial conditions and are otherwise identical. Thus, 
in statistical mechanics, we find objective probability statements even though the systems 
investigated are fully deterministic. And even though probability is objective, in statistical 
mechanics, the reason why scientists use probabilistic thinking is the finite nature of human 
reason.  
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The case is very different in quantum mechanics. There, probabilistic reasoning is used be-
cause there exist states of quantum systems which do not fully determine the outcome of 
measurements. Even though unobserved quantum systems are governed by deterministic 
laws—namely the time-dependent Schrödinger equation—as soon as a measurement is per-
formed, the dynamics of the system changes radically and it starts to behave unpredictably. 
However, this unpredictability is fundamentally different from the unpredictability found in 
classical statistical mechanics, for, as a matter of principle, it cannot be overcome by any 
amount of additional information and computing power. Quantum mechanics is statistical 
because of the indeterministic nature of the measurement process, not because of the finite 
nature of human reason. Accordingly, in quantum mechanics, probability statements express 
irreducibly stochastic propensities of quantum systems.  
As these two examples demonstrate, concepts like chance and probability can differ even 
within a single scientific discipline. If we turn to evolutionary theory—which I will do in an 
instant—there is thus little reason to expect that the concepts of chance and probability are the 
same as in physics, or even that they are they same in different biological theories. 
 
 
4. An Instrumentalist View 
 
In the recent literature in philosophy of biology we find two different accounts of the statis-
tical nature of evolutionary theory. The first account has been developed independently by 
Alex Rosenberg (1994) and Barbara Horan (1994), and it looks roughly as follows: Rosen-
berg and Horan hold that all the processes which are relevant for evolutionary change are de-
terministic. They argue that, even though there exist genuinely indeterministic events at the 
microphysical level, this indeterminism vanishes asymptotically as we move from the micro- 
to the macrolevel. In other words, indeterminism may play a role at the level of chemical 
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bonds or below, but it plays no role in the macroscopic world of biological organisms. This 
raises the question of why evolutionary theory uses statistical reasoning and probabilistic con-
cepts.  
Rosenberg develops his answer to this question in the context of the theory of genetic drift. 
To this end, he invented the following fictional example (1994, 71-73): Consider a population 
of giraffes which, for unknown reasons, shifts away from its adaptive peak in neck length. A 
team of conservation biologists attributes this change to random genetic drift, in other words, 
to the chance survival of genotypes which have shorter necks. Rosenberg then assumes that 
the real reason for the change in neck lengths is illegal poaching. In other words, long-necked 
giraffes are killed by poachers on a regular basis. The conservation biologists are unaware of 
this poaching activity, and this is why they attribute the evolutionary change observed to ran-
dom genetic drift. Rosenberg concludes that the theory of genetic drift, in this fictional exam-
ple, fails to give us the true explanation of evolutionary change. The theory of drift is merely 
a way of expressing the biologists’ ignorance concerning the real causes of evolutionary 
change. Rosenberg then generalizes from this example and claims that the same is true for all 
cases where biologists invoke genetic drift in order to explain evolutionary change. In other 
words, in all the alleged cases of drift known to biologists, there is a hidden cause or a set of 
hidden causes which are responsible for the observed changes in gene frequencies. In his fic-
tional example, the hidden cause is given by the poachers. In other cases of drift, the hidden 
causes may be something else. Rosenberg’s claim is that there are always hidden causes when 
biologists see genetic drift. Thus, he concludes the theory of drift is merely a “useful fiction”.  
Rosenberg’s argument does not stop here, for he eventually arrives at far-reaching conclu-
sions. He concludes that the probabilities which feature in evolutionary theory are subjective 
(1994, 61). According to this view, the probability, say, that a certain allele of gene is fixed in 
a small population by chance merely expresses a human agent’s degree of belief in the state-
ment that the allele is fixed. As a consequence, the theory of random genetic drift says noth-
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ing about the real causes of evolutionary change. It only says something about what humans 
can rationally expect to happen in a small population of organisms in the absence of any addi-
tional causal information. Thus, Rosenberg is an instrumentalist about the theory of genetic 
drift.  
Roberta Millstein (1996) has shown that Rosenberg’s example which is supposed to demon-
strate the instrumentalist nature of drift theory is fundamentally flawed. The way he has set up 
his example, it is really an example of selection rather than drift. What is actually going on in 
his fictional example is that the poachers select for short-necked giraffes. The example is ill-
chosen for making any claims about genetic drift, because it simply does not qualify as a case 
of random drift. Furthermore, it is unlikely that biologists would invoke genetic drift in a case 
where there seems to be a systematic bias in the survival rate towards short-necked giraffes. 
They would rather look for a cause for this bias in survival rate. Thus, Rosenberg’s fictional 
example fails to support his subjective account of probability and the resulting instrumentalist 
view of genetic drift theory. Of course, this does not yet mean that such an account is incor-
rect. It could still be that Rosenberg is right and that the theory of genetic drift fails to give us 
true explanations of certain cases of evolutionary change. In the next Section, I will offer ad-
ditional criticism of this view. Before I come to this, I would like to critically review a similar 
account of the statistical  character of evolutionary theory, namely the account given by Bar-
bara Horan. 
Like Rosenberg, Horan is a determinist with respect to evolutionary processes (Horan 1994). 
Furthermore, she has also argued that the probabilities which appear in evolutionary models 
are subjective or “epistemic” and that, therefore, only an instrumentalist account of evolution-
ary theory is justified. However, her argumentation is sufficiently different from Rosenberg’s 
to merit special consideration. 
Horan wants to dissolve a potential problem for instrumentalist accounts of evolutionary 
theory. The problem is the following. If evolutionary models are merely instruments telling a 
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rational agent what evolutionary outcomes she should expect, how can evolutionary theory 
provide causal explanations of evolutionary change? Her strategy of dissolving this problem 
is by rejecting the premise that evolutionary models are causal. Horan argues that the models 
of population genetics—widely seen as the core of Neo-Darwinian theory—fail to give us 
causal explanations. The main gist of her argument is that population genetic equations do not 
relate causes to their effects; they merely relate effects to one another. Take, for example, 
models for selection at a single genetic locus. Such models contain a theoretical quantity 
called selection coefficients. Such coefficients specify the proportion of alleles that survive to 
the next generation. Horan argues that these coefficients are defined by their effects, namely 
the rate of transmission of alleles into the next generation. 
I think that this argument proves too much, for it could be used to show that Newtonian me-
chanics fails to give us causal explanations. On some interpretations of classical mechanics, 
force is defined by acceleration, i.e., by its effect. Thus, Horan’s argument could be applied 
mutatis mutandis to Newtonian mechanics. Thus, the argument, if taken at face value, does 
not only undermine the causal nature of evolutionary theory, it undermines the causal nature 
of all dynamical theories. Surely, this is against Horan’s intentions, because her argument 
seems to be directed at evolutionary theory specifically. Of course, she could argue that there 
is a substantial difference between Newtonian mechanics and population genetic models in 
that force is not defined by acceleration. The relationship between force and acceleration 
could be contingent or empirical. But this defense invites the question of why the relationship 
between selection coefficients and gene frequency changes cannot be viewed as empirical. On 
the standard view of population genetic models, selection coefficients represents the fitness of 
the genotypes involved. What stops us from saying that fitness differences are a cause of gene 
frequency changes? If viewed this way, the relationship between selection coefficients and 
gene frequency changes is not definitional, it is causal. Thus, population genetics comes out 
as a causal theory after all. Of course, Horan could argue that it is inappropriate to view fit-
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ness as a causal disposition. But such an argument is lacking in her account. Her attack on the 
causal nature of population genetic theory thus reduces to the old “tautology objection” to the 
empirical status of selection theory, an objection which has been rejected by several authors 
(e.g., Mills and Beatty 1979, Hodge 1987).  
So far, we have seen that Rosenberg’s and Horan’s arguments for a subjective view of prob-
ability and a resulting instrumentalist view of evolutionary theory are deficient. It must be 
emphasized again that this does not imply that their views are incorrect, it only means that 
they have failed to produce positive arguments in their support. It is therefore worth examin-
ing whether their position could be strengthened. 
It is important to realize that Rosenberg’s and Horan’s arguments fail even if determinism is 
true. Let me come back to Rosenberg’s attempt to show that the theory of genetic drift is 
merely a “useful fiction”. Is it possible to reject this conclusion without rejecting the determi-
nistic premise on which it rests? I suggest that this is possible, and we don’t even have to con-
struct any new arguments to show this. In his influential book The Nature of Selection, Elliott 
Sober (1984, 126) has argued that even if evolutionary processes are assumed to be determi-
nistic, there are reasons to believe that the statistical models of evolutionary theory provide 
genuine causal explanations. In order to show this, Sober imagines a Laplacian demon who 
can calculate the fate of any population of organisms. Sober then asks whether such a Lapla-
cian supercalculator would have any need for statistical models of evolutionary change. The 
answer is yes, according to Sober, for the following reasons. Statistical evolutionary models, 
such as the models for random genetic drift, abstract from the specific causal details which 
determine survival and reproduction in particular populations and arrive at significant gener-
alizations which hold for a large class of very different populations which have nothing else 
in common. These significant generalizations define natural kinds which are invisible in the 
Laplacian demon’s convoluted calculations. The knowledge of these higher-level natural 
kinds—formulated in the language of probability—contributes to our understanding, thus the 
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statistical generalizations are genuinely explanatory. Laplace’s demon, on his part, simply 
wouldn’t see the wood for the trees. 
Rosenberg, of course, is aware of this argument. However, he can reject it by denying that 
the generalizations of evolutionary theory pick out natural kinds. Sober’s significant generali-
zations, according to Rosenberg (1994, 76), only appear as significant to cognitively limited 
beings such as humans. Sober’s only argument for the reality of these kinds seems to be that if 
we don’t allow such higher-level natural kinds, then other special sciences such as psychology 
are doomed as well. For example, the psychological concept of intentional states, according 
to Sober, is analogous to the concept of probability in evolutionary theory in that it provides 
us with natural kinds which are invisible at the micro-level. Rosenberg finds this unconvinc-
ing, because the existence of natural kinds in the realm of psychology is far from established. 
And even if it were established, Sober would only have an argument from analogy for the 
reality of natural kinds of evolutionary processes.  
 The question is where the burden of proof lies in this argumentative standoff. Does Sober 
has to show that the statistical generalizations of evolutionary theory pick out genuine natural 
kinds, or does Rosenberg have to show that they fail to do so? I think this is largely a matter 
of one’s greater metaphysical predilections. For those of us who do believe that special sci-
ences such as biology or psychology are in the business of discovering natural kinds and that 
they succeed at least sometimes, Sober’s arguments carry some weight. For someone like 
Rosenberg, for whom the epistemological status of special sciences is more precarious, the 
argument appears weak.  
I find myself on Sober’s side in this question, that is, I would not want to confine natural 
kinds to the micro-physical level. At the end of the day, Rosenberg’s and Horan’s instrumen-
talist accounts of evolutionary theory rest on nothing but an extremely strong and problematic 
reductionistic assumption, namely that only theories which treat phenomena at the most fun-
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damental level can be true. If this assumption is rejected, determinism about biological proc-
esses does not imply instrumentalism about evolutionary theory (Weber, forthcoming). 
 
 
5. A Realist View 
 
Robert Brandon and Scott Carson (1996) reject the view that biological processes are deter-
ministic. In their account of the statistical character of evolutionary theory, the source of 
probability is not the finite nature of human reason, but objective chance events in the devel-
opment of individual organisms. They have offered two independent arguments in support of 
this contention. I will review these arguments in Section 7. Right now, what I want to do is 
point out some internal difficulties in their account of the statistical nature of evolutionary 
theory.  
The starting point of Brandon’s and Carson’s analysis is their belief that the processes and 
relations postulated in evolutionary theory are real. Thus, in contrast to Rosenberg and Horan, 
Brandon and Carson are realists with respect to evolutionary theory. Their justifying reason 
for this belief is the fact that evolutionary theory is “one of the most highly confirmed theories 
in the history of science” (1996, 316). Thus, Brandon and Carson think that a high degree of 
empirical confirmation of a scientific theory provides reasons to believe that the processes 
and relations postulated in the theory are real, and they think, in addition, that contemporary 
evolutionary theory qualifies as a highly confirmed theory. I am not going to argue this point, 
since this position is certainly respectable. What I want to take issue with are the conclusions 
they draw from these starting assumptions. 
Brandon and Carson want to reject the view defended by Rosenberg and Horan that the 
probabilities which appear in evolutionary models are subjective probabilities or degrees of 
belief. Their approach of undermining this account is by rejecting the central premise from 
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which Rosenberg and Horan started out, namely that biological processes are deterministic. If 
evolutionary theory provides us with true descriptions of reality, they argue, it must be as-
sumed that the concept of probability represents stochastic dispositions of individual organ-
isms. For example, fitness is such a stochastic disposition. Fitness does not uniquely deter-
mine how many offspring a biological individual will have, and the reason for this is that in-
determinism prevents that the organism’s physical properties fix exactly how many offspring 
the organism will produce. Thus, Brandon and Carson prefer a propensity interpretation of 
fitness (first developed by Mills and Beatty 1979). Probabilistic propensities are thought of as 
real properties of individual organisms, therefore, realism about evolutionary theory is saved 
from the instrumentalists’ attack.  
My first objection to this line of reasoning is the following. Brandon and Carson jump to the 
conclusion that the realist about evolutionary theory must accept a propensity interpretation of 
probability too quickly. Although they are right that realism requires an objective interpreta-
tion of probability, the propensity interpretation is not the only objective interpretation con-
ceivable. There are other objective interpretations, for example, the limiting frequency inter-
pretation of probability. Frequency interpretations are neutral with respect to the question 
whether the events on which probability is measured are deterministic or not. There also exist 
interpretations of probability which are not neutral with respect to this question. Attempts 
have been made to introduce a concept of probability which applies to deterministic systems 
(e.g., von Plato 1982). Popper’s original formulation of the propensity interpretation (Popper 
1959) suggests that it is also applicable to deterministic systems, even though, for Popper, the 
main motivation for introducing the propensity interpretation was quantum mechanics. Let us 
also remember that statistical mechanics, which treats fully deterministic systems, conceives 
of probabilities as objective features of ensembles (see Section 3). Thus, Brandon and Carson 
are mistaken in thinking that objective probability implies objective chance. Especially statis-
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tical mechanics is living proof that this is not so, for—as I have pointed out earlier—it com-
bines objective probability with subjective chance.  
It is clear that nothing in what I have said so far is an argument against Brandon’s and Car-
son’s view that evolutionary probabilities do, in fact, represent genuine stochastic propensi-
ties. Now I want to show that this is problematic, too. 
To see this, consider the following thought experiment. A colony of genetically identical 
plants is found, in a given year, to produce different numbers of seeds. A biologist samples 
the numbers of seeds produced by each individual plant and calculates the probability distri-
bution that a plant of this genotype produces 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., or n seeds. For most theoretical 
purposes, the arithmetic mean of this distribution:  
 
(where pi is the probability that an individual plant produces i seeds) will provide an estimate 
of the genotype’s fitness.3 Now let us make the following assumption: Let the variation in 
seed number be result of some objective chance events during the plants’ development. Under 
this assumption, the probabilities pi could be interpreted as representing an irreducibly sto-
chastic disposition of plants of that genotype to produce i seeds. In other words, the probabili-
ties could then be read as expressing genuine probabilistic propensities. It is Brandon’s and 
Carson’s view that all applications of the concept of probability in evolutionary theory are to 
be interpreted in this manner.  
But now let’s change our hypothetical example only slightly. Let us now assume that the 
variation in seed production is not the result of objective chance events. Instead, there is a set 
of hidden variables which determines the number of seeds produced. This could be any set of 
causal variables which influence the growth of the plant and which we do not know. In this 
case, we could not read the probabilities pi as irreducibly stochastic propensities. The stochas-
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ticity observed is now a mere illusion created by our ignorance of the hidden variables. How-
ever, the probabilities pi would not be rendered subjective or “merely epistemic” in this sce-
nario—contrary to what Brandon and Carson as well as Rosenberg and Horan would make us 
believe. It is still possible to interpret the probabilities pi as expressing a property that plants 
of this genotype actually posses, a property which is determined by the plant’s physical prop-
erties and their environment and which is invariant with respect to the different values of the 
hidden variables.  
It is clear that both of my hypothetical scenarios—the one with and the one without the hid-
den variables—are compatible with current evolutionary theory. In fact, in most theoretical 
contexts, it will not matter at all for using the probability values in question in order to predict 
or explain what will happen to these plants, for example, if they have to compete with plants 
of a different genotype. However, I believe that my two scenarios demonstrate the inadequacy 
of Brandon’s and Carson account of the statistical nature of evolutionary theory. The reason is 
that their account can only treat the first scenario—the one without the hidden variables. But 
surely, the second scenario—the one with the hidden variables—also occurs in nature. I do 
not know whether objective chance events exist in the biological domain, nor how frequent 
they are if they exist. I will come back to this question in Section 7. All I want to claim right 
now is that it is a safe bet that a substantial proportion of biological variation which we ob-
serve is a result of some hidden variables. If this is true, then Brandon’s and Carson’s account 
of chance and probability in evolution has to be rejected because it sees objective chance as 
the only source of probability. Their account does not apply to cases where there are evolu-
tionarily relevant hidden variables in biological processes, and yet the existence of such vari-
ables is highly likely regardless of whether the biological domain is strictly deterministic or 
not (Weber, forthcoming). 
I therefore conclude that Brandon’s and Carson’s account of the statistical character of evo-
lutionary theory fails to give us an adequate account of evolutionary processes as we know 
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them. Since the same is true about Rosenberg’s and Horan’s account, we urgently need an 
alternative. This is what I turn to now.  
 
 
6. Are There Alternatives? 
 
The following table summarizes the two accounts of the statistical nature of evolutionary 
theory that I have examined so far: 
 
 Rosenberg, Horan: Brandon & Carson: 
Determinism: yes no 
Eliminability: yes no 







Realism: no yes 
 
This table contains various epistemological and metaphysical claims which do not necessar-
ily imply each other. For example, I have argued—contra Rosenberg and Horan—that deter-
minism about biological processes does not imply instrumentalism about evolutionary theory, 
and—contra Brandon and Carson—that a scientific realist is not committed to indeterminism 
or a propensity interpretation of probability. This suggests that, by playing around with this 
table, we can easily generate alternative accounts of the statistical character of evolutionary 
theory and check them for coherence. In theory, we could try all possible combinations of 
positions with regard to the different claims that are included in the table. Some of these com-
binations will clearly be incoherent or even self-contradictory, while others might be consis-
tent, coherent, and metaphysically plausible. However, I do not want to bore the reader with 
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such a systematic exercise. Instead, I will present the combination of claims which I find most 







Determinism: yes no mostly 











subjective propensity ? 
Realism: no yes yes 
 
 
Determinism: I think that a viable interpretation of evolutionary models that use probabili-
ties should at least be consistent with determinism. To the extent that biological variability 
which is relevant for evolution is caused by hidden variables, the evolutionary process is de-
terministic, even if this does not necessarily exclude the occasional intrusion of objective 
chance events. As we have seen in the previous section, Brandon’s and Carson’s account fails 
because it cannot adequately explicate the relationship between such hidden variables, which 
are likely to exist, and evolutionary probabilities. Therefore, an adequate interpretation of 
probability in evolutionary theory should proceed as if evolution was a deterministic process.  
Eliminability: This is the question of whether an omniscient being (e.g., Laplace’s demon) 
could produce a theory of evolutionary change which does not require any probabilistic rea-
soning. All we can say about this question is that, presumably, the statistical character of evo-
lutionary theory is eliminable in principle if the evolutionary process is fully deterministic. By 
contrast, such elimination is clearly impossible of the evolutionary process is indeterministic. 
However, such considerations are strictly counterfactual since, to my knowledge, there are no 
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omniscient beings. The crucial point to note here is that in principle-eliminability does not 
imply instrumentalism. It is not incoherent to believe that evolutionary theory is eliminable in 
principle (i.e., for an omniscient being) and, at the same time, to accept a realist interpretation 
of current evolutionary theory. All we have to assume is that special sciences like biology can 
have some access to reality even if they fail to produce complete accounts of the processes in 
their domain. The scientific realist is not committed to the thesis that true theories are com-
plete in the sense that they incorporate the maximally possible causal information concerning 
the phenomena they treat. Thus, the question of eliminability can be dissociated from the real-
ism issue and therefore pushed into the realm of science fiction. 
Source of probability: The main issue in this debate, so far, has been whether the source of 
probability, i.e., the reason(s) why evolutionary models use probabilities have to be sought in 
the nature of the process itself (as indeterminists hold) or in our ignorance of the real causes 
of evolutionary change (as some determinists maintain). On my account, the source of prob-
ability is located in the hidden variables. To be precise, the source of probability lies in the 
fact that the hidden variables are hidden. Basically, this amounts to the same as saying that 
the source of probability is ignorance or cognitive limitation, but I prefer this way of speaking 
because it is more precise. 
Interpretation of probability: This is clearly the crux of the matter and will therefore be dis-
cussed separately (see below). 
Realism: The position that I am advocating is a realist one. Obviously, a defense of scientific 
realism in general or of realism about evolutionary theory specifically is beyond the scope of 
this essay. All I would like to claim here is that realism about current evolutionary theory is at 
least as justified as realism about other mature scientific theories. If it is all justifiable, on 
metaphysical and epistemological grounds, to be a realist about the entities and causal proc-
esses postulated by well-tested scientific theories, then it is reasonable to assume that current 
models of natural selection and genetic drift represent the causal structure of evolving popula-
 - 20 - 
tions of organisms at least approximately. The issue at stake here is how to maintain this real-
ism in the face of the challenge leveled specifically at evolutionary theory by Rosenberg and 
Horan, namely that determinism implies that statistical evolutionary models are mere predic-
tive devices and not representations of biological reality. In the previous Sections, I have 
shown that they have not established this conclusion, and that Brandon’s and Carson’s at-
tempt to rescue realism with the help of a thoroughgoing indeterminism fails. The question, 
then, is how realism about statistical evolutionary models can be defended on the basis of a 
positive account. 
The centerpiece of such a positive account, clearly, will have to be an objective interpreta-
tion of probability. Is there an interpretation of probability which is compatible with—but not 
necessarily committed to—determinism, and which is objective and therefore able to sustain a 
realist stance? Such an interpretation does exist for some domains of the physical world, for 
example, the domain of statistical mechanics. We have seen (Section 3) that the probabilities 
that appear there can be interpreted as objective properties of so-called ensembles, that is, 
fictional sets of systems which differ only in initial conditions. Clearly, this interpretation 
cannot be uncritically transferred to biological contexts because biological systems differ con-
siderably from the idealized physical systems treated in statistical mechanics.  
But perhaps there are some interesting analogies to statistical mechanics which could be 
fruitfully explored. Indeed, one of the pioneers of population genetics—R.A. Fisher—was 
quite fond of such analogies and has likened his “fundamental theorem of natural selection” to 
the second law of thermodynamics (Fisher 1930, 36), but I think this is mostly of historical 
interest. What I would like to suggest is that certain models of evolutionary change in finite 
populations bear an interesting analogy to the ensemble approach in statistical mechanics. 
Population geneticists, when they are treating populations of finite size, are unable to predict 
exactly what will happen to a particular population. The reason is the intrusion of chance fac-
tors like random sampling of gametes in small populations. The first quantitative theory of 
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evolutionary change to systematically take such effects into account was developed by Sewall 
Wright. He wrote in 1931: 
 
The gene frequencies of one generation may be expected to differ a little from those of 
the preceding merely by chance. In the course of generations this may bring about im-
portant changes, although the farther the drift from equilibrium the greater will be the 
pressure to return. The resultant of these tendencies is a certain frequency distribution, 
or probability curve, for gene frequencies in place of a single equilibrium value 
(Wright 1986, 93). 
 
Wright derived the following general formula for the probability distribution of gene fre-
quencies at a single genetic locus: 
 
 
In this model, y is the probability that an allele will reach a gene frequency of q from an ini-
tial frequency of qm in a population of size N. s represents the selection coefficient of the al-
lele, while u and v are the mutation rates from and to the allele, respectively. m is the rate of 
migration. Figure 1 shows some of the properties of Wright’s model graphically. The four 
charts represent probability arrays for relative gene frequencies, i.e., for any given gene fre-
quency between 0.0 and 1.0, the graph gives the probability that the population will end up at 
this frequency. If the population is very small (Chart I), the gene will either be lost or fixed by 
random drift. By contrast, a very large population (Chart III) will hold the gene frequency at 
an equilibrium value that is determined by natural selection, mutation, and migration. In an 
intermediately sized population (Chart II), the gene frequency will draft at random about their 
equilibrium values. Chart IV shows a situation of a large species with partially isolated sub-
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groups, i.e., a high migration pressure and intermediately sized populations (thought to be 
most favorable for evolution by Wright). 
How should we interpret the probabilities that feature in this model? According to Rosen-
berg’s subjective interpretation, we should read these probabilities as expressing degrees of 
belief, for example, belief in the proposition that an allele will be fixed by random drift. Al-
ternatively, if we were to follow Brandon and Carson and several other philosophers of biol-
ogy, we should interpret these probabilities as irreducibly stochastic dispositions (propensi-
ties) that each individual in the population possesses. However, I suggest that there is an in-
terpretation which is more in line with Sewall Wright’s own thinking than both the subjective 
and propensity interpretations. Namely, we can interpret these probabilities as measuring the 
frequency of populations with a given gene frequency in a hypothetical, infinite set of popula-
tions which contain the same number of individuals and the same initial gene frequencies. In 
other words, we can interpret probability as a property of an ensemble. 
That Wright conceived of his probability distributions in this manner is supported, for ex-
ample, by the following passage from the Galton Lecture which Wright gave at University 
College, London, in 1950 (explaining the results of his theoretical calculations on evolution in 
natural populations under the combined action of various evolutionary forces including fluc-
tuations due to random sampling): 
 
The resultant is a probability distribution of frequencies of gene frequencies which ap-
plies to any one strain in the long run, or to an array of strains, subject to the same 
conditions, at any one time (Wright 1986, 586, my italics). 
 
When Wright says “frequencies of gene frequencies”, what he means is the proportion of 
populations with a given gene frequency in an ensemble of populations which are identical in 
all respects but the unique chance events that cause gene frequencies to fluctuate randomly.  
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A look at contemporary textbooks in population genetics shows that scientists still think of 
probability distributions for gene frequencies in this way. For example, the eminent popula-
tion biologist Joan Roughgarden writes:  
 
Because any specific population shows a random amount of sampling error, we cannot 
hope to predict exactly what any given population will do. But we can combine the re-
sults of several populations and observe the properties of a group of populations 
(Roughgarden 1996, 58, my italics). 
 
Roughgarden then goes on to calculate probability distributions for gene frequencies under 
various conditions. The approach taken is still basically Sewall Wright’s, except that Rough-
garden uses more advanced mathematical theory, namely stochastic theory. In Roughgarden’s 
presentation of the models, the probability that a system is in a certain state at a given time is 
interpreted as a frequency of systems in that state in an infinite set of systems called the en-
semble. He even explicitly draws the analogy to the ensemble approach in statistical mechan-
ics (p. 61). 
What I would like to show with this short excursion into population genetic theory is that 
theoretical biologists, at least when developing certain models of evolutionary change, inter-
pret probability in a similar way like physicists do in statistical mechanics. In these models, 
probability assignments are intended to have representational content with respect to real bio-
logical systems, contrary to what Rosenberg and Horan think. Probabilities represent frequen-
cies in the limit to infinitely large ensembles of populations. Yet, like in statistical mechanics, 
these applications of the concept of probability are fully compatible with determinism. The 
differences between the individual populations in the ensemble that cause random fluctuations 
could be entirely due to hidden variables rather than objective chance. Thus, in these models, 
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probability does not necessarily represent irreducibly stochastic propensities, as Brandon and 
Carson and other philosophers of biology believe.  
I think I have at least made it plausible that alternatives to both the Rosenberg/Horan and 
Brandon/Carson account of the statistical character of evolutionary theory exist. I have 
sketched how an alternative which combines determinism with objective probability and real-
ism about evolutionary theory might look like in the context of some models of evolution in 
finite populations. However, I am not sure whether the approach I have taken could be trans-
ferred to other applications of the concept of probability in evolutionary theory, for instance, 
macroevolutionary models, or the origin of mutations. We must be open to the possibility that 
there is no single account of chance and probability which would cover all of modern evolu-
tionary theory.4 
In the next Section, I would like to address a question which I have neglected so far: Are 
biological processes deterministic or not? 
 
 
7. The Determinism Question 
 
Brandon and Carson (1996) have produced two independent arguments that are intended to 
support indeterminism about biological processes. The first argument purports to establish 
that quantum indeterminism can have population-level effects. Brandon and Carson imagine a 
population which is at an unstable equilibrium point, such that one newly arising mutation can 
make the difference which one of two alleles will be fixed by natural selection. They then 
argue that, since mutation is a microphysical process which could, in theory, be caused by 
quantum events, it is at least conceivable that the fate of an entire population is subject to 
quantum indeterminism. The way they put this is by saying that quantum events could “perco-
 - 25 - 
late up” all the way to the level of biological populations. Another locution they use is that 
quantum indeterminism could “infect” the population level.  
I do not think that, at present, this kind of scenario can be ruled out altogether. Brandon and 
Carson do admit that their argument does not amount to a strict “no hidden variables-proof” 
of the kind which has been produced in quantum mechanics. However, I would like to sound 
some words of caution about such a recourse to the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. 
Brandon and Carson’s talk about quantum effects “percolating up” or “infecting” the popu-
lation level is misleading. It does not fit with the orthodox interpretations of quantum me-
chanics. One of the many remarkable features about quantum mechanics is that, so long as a 
system is not observed, it evolves according to deterministic laws. Thus, there is, in this case, 
no indeterminism which could “percolate up” or “infect” anything. Quantum indeterminism 
does not arise simply because systems are very small. It only arises once a microphysical sys-
tem is subjected to measurement. In other words, indeterminism arises when some measure-
ment device is coupled to the system, which collapses its wave function. In such situations, 
the outcome of the measurement can be uncertain in the strong sense of objective chance. To 
my knowledge, this is the only form of objective chance which is recognized by modern phys-
ics. Note that this indeterminism is a feature which emerges at the macroscopic level under 
certain conditions—namely measurement conditions—and not something which “percolates 
up” from the microlevel unpredictably. It is a property of a whole quantum system coupled to 
a measurement apparatus.  
The problem is thus that Brandon and Carson seem to take it for granted that quantum me-
chanics has shown that we live in a fundamentally indeterministic universe, and that the ques-
tion in biology can only be whether its domain partakes in this indeterminism. However, no 
such conclusion is warranted. What quantum mechanics shows is that the universe is funda-
mentally deterministic—unless measurements are performed. But does evolution perform 
measurements? I do not believe that anyone can answer this question at present. This ought to 
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be a question for scientific research rather than metaphysical speculation. At present, no 
strong claims should be made about the relevance or irrelevance of quantum mechanics to 
biological processes.  
How about Brandon’s and Carson’s second argument for indeterminism? This argument 
does not make any use of quantum mechanics. In fact, it purports to demonstrate an autono-
mous form of indeterminism for biology.  
Brandon’s and Carson’s autonomous argument is an argument from empirical evidence. In 
other words, these authors think that experiments in evolutionary biology support indetermin-
ism in the same way in which experiments can be said to support a theory. The evidence they 
have in mind comes from, e.g., experiments with cloned plants, which show a considerable 
amount of variation even if environmental conditions are kept highly homogenous.  
There is an obvious reply by the determinist to this empirical argument for indeterminism. 
She could defend her position by arguing that if cloned plants show variation, then the envi-
ronment was not homogenous after all. Or perhaps there are some internal hidden variables 
responsible for this variation, something like “developmental noise”. Brandon and Carson are 
aware of this possible refutation of their argument by determinists. However, they think that 
they can defuse this objection with a methodological argument. They proceed by asking what 
theoretical purpose the postulate of deterministic hidden variables may serve. In their view, 
the only purpose that this postulate serves is to rescue determinism from empirical refutation. 
These variables, therefore, are not theoretically fruitful; they must be removed on methodo-
logical grounds. Brandon and Carson, thus, apply a methodological rule that reads “never 
postulate hidden variables unless they are theoretically fruitful”.  
Roberta Millstein (2000) has criticized this argument against determinism. According to her, 
the indeterminist who attributes any variation which is yet unexplained to objective chance 
runs the risk of overlooking some important causal variables. Far from being theoretically 
unfruitful, thus, the postulate of hidden variables may lead to the discovery of yet unknown 
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biological processes5. Therefore, we are once again faced with the question of where the bur-
den of proof lies: Does the determinist have to show that hidden variables do more theoretical 
work than merely saving determinism, or does the indeterminist have to show that there are 
no hidden variables? Determinists and indeterminists are equally at risk of committing an er-
ror; the former risk the error of dogmatically sticking to a metaphysical doctrine with the help 
of the ad hoc-postulate of hidden variables, while the latter are at risk of missing some impor-
tant causal information. How should these cognitive risks be balanced? 
If this question cannot be rationally answered, Brandon and Carson have not established in-
determinism. Millstein concludes that the only rational attitude for a scientific realist to take is 
agnosticism. In other words, there are, at present, no strong reasons for preferring either de-
terminism or indeterminism about evolutionary processes.  
In the final Section, I will show that this conclusion limits our ability to understand the 
metaphysical foundations of Darwinism. 
 
 
8. Agnosticism and the Limits of Metaphysics 
 
If we cannot decide, at present, whether evolutionary processes are deterministic or indeter-
ministic, any account of the statistical nature of evolutionary theory is bound to be incom-
plete. We are here reaching the limits of metaphysical inquiry. Only empirical science can tell 
us whether quantum mechanics is relevant for evolutionary theory, or whether there is an 
autonomous biological indeterminism, as Brandon and Carson have suggested. But without 
this knowledge, we cannot give a universally valid interpretation of chance and probability, 
i.e., an interpretation which will cover all the instances of probabilistic models of evolutionary 
change. Clearly, these models work just as well regardless of whether the processes they rep-
resent are deterministic or indeterministic. For all explanatory purposes of evolutionary the-
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ory, and for all current methods of testing evolutionary models in the field, determinism and 
indeterminism are empirically equivalent.  
In conclusion, I suggest that there are at least two senses in which Darwinism (and Neo-
Darwinism) is, indeed, a theory for finite beings. If we accept that evolutionary processes are 
effectively deterministic (in the sense explained in Section 6), then we must admit that the 
statistical nature of evolutionary models is a manifestation of human cognitive limitation. 
However, I have shown that this conclusion does not commit us to instrumentalism, provided 
that we can come up with an objective interpretation of probability which is compatible with 
determinism and, at the same time, applicable to evolutionary theory or parts thereof. I have 
sketched such an interpretation for a certain class of models of evolution in finite populations 
by using the ensemble concept. But, on a more skeptical note, a critical examination of Bran-
don’s and Carson’s argumentation for indeterminism shows that there are no strong reasons 
for preferring either a determinist or indeterminist position with regard to the nature of chance 
in evolution. What this means is that evolutionary theory reveals the finite nature of human 
reason by using concepts like chance and probability in a fruitful way, yet without us fully 




Special thanks to Paul Hoyningen-Huene for many helpful suggestions. 
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Footnotes 
 
1 An excellent analysis of the different roles of chance in evolution has been given by Roberta 
Millstein (1997). 
2 For the following, I am relying on Sklar (1993). 
3 Beatty and Finsen (1989) point out that, in some instances, other parameters of the distribu-
tion, e.g., variance or skew, will be relevant for the genotype’s fitness. However, this is of no 
relevance for my thought experiment. 
4 I owe this insight to Kenneth Waters. 
5 My favorite example is the ground-breaking research of Barbara McClintock. She would 
never have discovered mobile genetic elements had she attributed the yet unexplained varia-
tions in her maize plants to an ineliminable indeterminism or objective chance. 
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Figure 1. Sewall Wright’s one-locus model of evolution in finite populations (1931). The 
four graphs show the distribution of probability that a population of size N will reach a gene 
frequency of q. Gene frequencies are shown on the abscissa. Chart I shows the result for a 
population in which the product of size and selection coefficient (4Ns) is small. Such popula-
tions are most likely to either lose (q = 0) or fix (q = 1) the allele by random drift. Chart III 
shows the extreme case of an infinite population. In this case, the variance of the distribution 
approaches zero: that is, the population will reach an equilibrium state deter- mined by the 
selection coefficients and the mutation rates (u) with a probability of 1. Charts II and IV show 
intermediate cases with various values for population size, selection coefficients, initial fre-
quencies (q), and mutation rates (m). The probability values (y axis) can be interpreted as fre-
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quencies of populations in an ensemble. Reprinted with permission from The American Statis-
tician. Copyright 1931 by the American Statistical Association. All rights reserved. 
 
